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PERUVIAN MICROFINANCE: 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS  
AND INDUSTRY OUTLOOK
Hilbert Chen
Introduction
 Peru is among the world’s most 
competitive and innovative microfinance 
markets and often finds itself atop international 
country rankings for having the best business 
environment for microfinance (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit). The microfinance industry 
in Peru has contributed to the development of 
the Peruvian economy and benefited the general 
population. Over the past decade, Peru has been 
one of the fastest-growing economies in South 
America, with an average annual GDP growth 
rate of 5.9 percent in a low average inflation 
environment of 2.9 percent (World Bank). As 
a direct consequence, Peru experienced strong 
growth in both employment and income as 
well as sharply lower poverty rates. In 2005, an 
estimated 55.6 percent of Peru’s population was 
in poverty; in 2015, the poverty rate declined 
to approximately 21.8 percent (World Bank). 
However, as the microfinance sector in Peru 
matures, lenders must begin to discover other 
methods to sustain long-term growth. This 
article analyzes the development and current 
state of Peruvian microfinance, examines 
drivers of recent consolidation in the Peruvian 
market, and offers insight into the future of 
the Peruvian microfinance industry and overall 
financial services.
Microfinance and Its Origins
 Microfinance is the provision of financial 
services to low-income clients who have little 
or no access to an established banking sector 
(Rosenberg et al.). An organization that offers 
such services to the poor is called a microfinance 
institution (MFI). MFIs generally provide
 •  Small loans, typically for working capital
 •  Streamlined loan disbursement and 
monitoring
 •  An increasing array of financial services 
(such as savings, insurance, and money 
transfers) and non-financial services 
(such as education and healthcare)
114
 Muhammad Yunus, a Bangladeshi 
entrepreneur and Nobel Prize winner often 
perceived as the father of modern microfinance, 
was one of the first to reason that the low-income 
population might be able to pull themselves 
out of poverty if financial resources were made 
available to them on reasonable terms. Yunus 
started his microfinance operations when he 
made a simple $27 loan to a group of villagers 
in Bangladesh in 1974 (Yunus). He went on 
to found Grameen Bank in 1983 to promote 
microfinance on an international scale. Since 
its founding, the Grameen microfinance 
model, which revolves around group lending, 
has inspired similar financial inclusion efforts 
in over 100 countries including the United 
States (Wilson).
 Although Yunus is regarded by many as 
the father of modern microfinance, the first 
institution to begin microfinance operations 
was Accion, a non-profit organization (NPO) 
founded in 1961 by a University of California, 
Berkeley, law student named Joseph Blatchford. 
The NPO’s first projects mainly involved 
community development projects, such as 
building schools and managing negotiations 
between opposing community leaders. Soon 
the organization realized that the major 
cause of poverty was the lack of economic 
opportunity. In 1973 Accion began issuing 
small loans to small business owners in Brazil; 
it had a 99.5 percent repayment rate in the first 
year. With this success the NPO had identified 
an approach to addressing poverty. Accion is 
now a global organization with 35 partner MFIs 
in 21 countries across four continents (Accion, 
“Key Statistics”). Soon, the prominence of 
microfinance spread to Peru itself.
Overview of Peruvian Microfinance
 The roots of microfinance in Peru 
originated in the 1950s, but private-sector 
microfinance began to experience rapid growth 
in the 1990s when the industry was bolstered 
by a new policy framework of economic 
liberalization. This new framework was built on 
Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto’s theory 
that economic potential could be catalyzed 
by formalizing the economic activities of the 
poor and giving them access to basic financial 
services (Conger et al.).
Early Development  
of Microfinance in Peru
 Under this framework, regulated financial 
institutions in Peru currently fall into six 
distinct legal structures (Concha Zegarra et al.):
 1. Credit unions
 2.  Cajas Municipales de Ahorro y 
Crédito (Municipal Savings and Loan 
Institutions [CMACs])
 3.  Cajas Rurales de Ahorro y Crédito (Rural 
Savings and Loan Institutions [CRACs])
 4.  Empresa de Desarrollo de la Pequeña 
y Micro Empresa (Entities for the 
Development of Small and Micro 
Enterprises [EDPYMEs])
 5. Banks
 6. Financieras (finance companies)
Each of these six structures developed along 
somewhat different paths. Efforts toward 
financial inclusion for Peru’s poor trace a 
long series of steps, including significant 
foreign influence, that laid the institutional 
foundations of today’s world-leading 
microfinance sector. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
an American priest named Daniel McLellan 
helped develop Peru’s first credit unions and 
savings and loans associations (S&Ls), which 
have been paramount in the creation of Peru’s 
unique microfinance model (Conger et al.). 
The core innovation of these credit unions and 
S&Ls was establishing a link between savings 
and access to credit. Deposits were driven by 
the promise that membership provided access 
to borrowing, which gave rise to the Peruvian 
microfinance model’s principal tenet: that 
savings are a key complement to borrowing. 
American influence also came about in the 
1960s when the United States began providing 
development funds to Peru through the Inter-
American Development Bank. The rationale 
was that economic development would 
counter Peru’s domestic strife at the time. 
From microfinance’s earliest years, the Inter-
American Development Bank has remained 
important in capitalizing microfinance 
portfolios and providing funds for technical 
assistance to create capable and solvent MFIs.
 German influence was also essential 
in developing modern-day Peruvian 
microfinance. In the 1980s, Internationale 
Projekt Consult started building CMACs in 
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Peru with the support of Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Technische Zusammenarbeit, an agency 
that advocates technical cooperation. Modeled 
on German S&Ls, known as sparkassen, the 
creation of CMACs allowed local financial 
institutions to receive deposits from and lend 
to residents in Peru’s main cities (Ebentreich). 
Then in 1992, again following the German 
savings model, Peru created another significant 
type of MFI, called CRACs, to promote 
financial sector development in rural areas. 
CRACs originally focused on lending to the 
agricultural sector and could receive deposits 
as well.
 However, the most significant formation 
arguably came in 1982 when Accion formed 
Grupo ACP, a nongovernmental organization 
(NGO) based in Lima. ACP’s operations grew 
rapidly as it successfully provided credit to low-
income townships outside of Lima. Operating 
as an NGO and only providing loans, ACP was 
not subject to formal banking regulation. 
In the following two decades, various NGOs 
followed ACP’s footsteps and launched their 
own microcredit operations (Chu). As the 
microcredit industry began to gain traction, 
it began to draw attention from the public 
sector. In 1994 the Peruvian Superintendency 
of Banking, Insurance, and Private Pension 
Funds Administrators (SBS)—an autonomous 
agency with the function of supervising the 
entire financial system—attempted to regulate 
the microcredit sector by creating a new non–
deposit-taking regulated financial entity called 
EDPYMEs to incentivize credit-providing NGOs 
to seek formalization. However, ACP decided to 
apply for a full banking license instead, which 
would enable it to provide savings services as 
well because it already had the largest and 
most successful microcredit operation in 
the country. In 1998 Grupo ACP converted 
to Mibanco, Peru’s first full microfinance 
bank. Mibanco offers both credit and savings 
products and has since become the leader 
and largest MFI in the Peruvian microfinance 
industry.
 In addition to Mibanco, the other main 
MFI that successfully spread microfinance 
across Peru was Financiera Edyficar (Edyficar). 
Edyficar was originally founded in 1997 as an 
NGO but transitioned into an EDPYME in 
1998 when it realized it could not access the 
financing required to expand its microfinance 
operations under a non-profit structure. By 
the end of 2006, Edyficar was the largest 
EDPYME in Peru. Its main product, which 
accounted for approximately 90 percent of its 
loans, was individual loans to micro- and small 
enterprises. By 2008, Edyficar reconstituted 
as a financiera (a deposit-taking financial 
institution), a corporate formation just short 
of a fully functioning bank. Edyficar went on 
to become Peru’s second-largest MFI.
 Peru clearly had an abundance of 
foreign influence early in the development 
of its microfinance industry. Soon, with the 
foundation provided by foreign influences, 
Peru would build its own unique microfinance 
structure.
Enabling Environment for 
Competition and Transparency
 Peru is widely considered to have one of 
the best regulatory and legal environments 
for microfinance in the world (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit). Much of Peru’s success in 
microfinance can be attributed to prudent 
regulation and strict supervision, balanced 
with limited government intervention. The SBS 
has significantly influenced the development 
of Peru’s microfinance sector and shaped its 
competitive environment. The regulatory body 
does not impose interest rate caps on regulated 
MFIs, allows for foreign investment, and 
maintains strict credit reporting requirements. 
The success of Peruvian microfinance is also 
attributed to the flexibility offered by the 
six regulatory types of financial institutions 
and the ability of firms to advance from one 
category to another (ResponsAbility, 2013). 
This progressive structure allows healthy, 
well-managed MFIs to eventually take 
deposits, which the Peruvian microfinance 
model considers an integral component to 
overall financial inclusion and microfinance 
and economic growth. By encouraging the 
formalization of the microfinance sector, the 
SBS has been able to pass regulations that 
dictate which institutions are allowed certain 
capacities and who can compete where as well 
as establish standards for transformation into 
full-fledged banks or deposit-taking financieras.
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 Other critical elements of Peruvian 
microfinance regulation are the credit bureaus 
and credit rating agencies (Concha Zegarra 
et al.). These institutions are fundamental to 
providing financial transparency and data, 
especially in the microfinance industry where 
credit information through traditional banking 
methods is not always available or current 
because many MFI clients operate in the 
informal economy (see article by Finn in this 
volume). In the early 1990s, the Consortium 
of Private Organizations to Promote the 
Development of Micro and Small Enterprises 
(COPEME) started tracking the credit history 
of microfinance clients, which encouraged self-
regulation among non-regulated institutions. 
The benefits of transparent credit history 
led to the creation of the first private credit 
bureau in 1997. Today, there are five private 
credit bureaus that provide credit ratings for 
individuals. Additionally, the SBS operates a 
public credit bureau that collects information 
on regulated lenders. Banks and all regulated 
MFIs are required to share their clients’ 
information on current, contingent, and total 
debt as well as on default rates every month. 
MFIs utilize credit bureau records as part of 
their own due diligence to evaluate risk and 
determine credit-worthiness. The presence of 
international credit rating agencies, such as 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, and 
rating agencies that specialize in microfinance, 
such as MicroRate, Micro-Credit Ratings 
International Limited, and Planet Rating, 
have further increased the transparency of the 
sector.
 Essentially, the presence of credit 
bureaus and rating agencies has made default 
and liquidity risk more transparent and 
controllable, which have made the microfinance 
sector more attractive to outside investors, 
namely, big multinational commercial banks 
(discussed later.) The regulation structure 
allowed Peruvian MFIs to grow continuously 
and extensively without their clients becoming 
overindebted. With this supervision, Peru now 
has one of the “most complete and timely 
credit information coverages in the world” 
(ResponsAbility, 2013).
 It is noteworthy that the SBS regulates 
the financial sector by product rather than type 
of institution. One effect of this arrangement 
is that different types of institutions can be 
competing for the same markets (Oxford 
Business Group, 2016). For example, CMACs 
were traditionally not allowed to serve clients 
outside their municipalities. However, the 
SBS approved regulation in 2002 that allowed 
CMACs to expand operations into cities where 
no other CMAC had jurisdiction (Concha 
Zegarra et al.), consequently increasing 
competition in urban areas. If different types 
of financial institutions are offering the same 
types of financial products and competing 
for the same customers in the same markets, 
this could lead to the development of a highly 
competitive market. Indeed, Peru has become 
such an environment.
Current Landscape and Trends
 Today, the Peruvian microfinance 
industry is mature and highly developed (J.P. 
Morgan Global Research). Of the 55 entities 
regulated by the SBS, 44 are now involved in 
microfinance, encompassing approximately 
4.8 million active borrowers and 5.1 million 
depositors (MIX Market). The industry gross 
loan portfolio grew from less than $1 billion in 
2001 to approximately $10.8 billion in 2016.
 For the past two decades, the microfinance 
sector in Peru has seen impressive growth and 
profitability, which has caused competition 
to increase in two important ways. As 
previously mentioned, in 2002 the SBS began 
permitting CMACs to operate outside their 
municipalities, which led to an abrupt increase 
of MFIs in many regions. Additionally, large 
commercial banks took notice of the success of 
microfinance and began to enter the industry. 
Prior to the success of Edyficar and Mibanco, 
traditional commercial banks were reluctant 
to enter microfinance markets due to a lack 
of transparency regarding the risk of lending 
to the poor. The established banking sector 
believed that the poor were financially illiterate 
and did not have adequate cash flow–generating 
capacity; therefore, they would not be able to 
pay back the interest and principal on loans. In 
addition, banks were worried about the poor’s 
lack of collateral to secure these high-risk loans. 
However, as the profitability of microfinance in 
Peru was proved by Edyficar and Mibanco, the 
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big Peruvian banks began to enter the sector. 
Due to this increase in competition, MFIs 
needed to improve efficiency, expand services, 
increase innovation, and reduce interest rates 
on loans.
 Intense competition has therefore put 
significant pricing pressure on existing MFIs. 
Competition has provided microentrepreneurs 
with access to a greater variety of lenders, 
which caused microcredit providers to 
significantly lower interest rates. In 2000, 
effective annualized interest rates on loans 
were over 50 percent. By 2012, the median 
interest yield of all Peruvian MFIs decreased 
to 29 percent (MIX Market). Since lending 
institutions earn their profits based on interest 
rate spreads, declining lending rates led to 
a decrease in overall profitability. One of the 
main metrics to assess the profitability of MFIs 
is return on equity (ROE), which measures 
profit per dollar of shareholders’ contributed 
capital. As shown in Figure 1, the profitability 
of Peruvian MFIs has significantly declined due 
to greater competition.
 The microfinance sector in Peru has now 
become a saturated market and MFIs are being 
pressured to improve efficiencies to offset 
declining profitability. Another telling sign of 
Peru’s market maturation has been the degree of 
market consolidation. For the past decade, the 
microfinance industry in Peru has undergone 
significant consolidation due to the increasing 
competition. As microfinance proved very 
profitable, three of Peru’s top four traditional 
commercial banks—Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria (BBVA), Scotiabank, and Banco de 
Crédito del Perú (BCP)—became interested 
in the area and began acquiring privately 
owned MFIs, accelerating consolidation in the 
sector. As discussed later, two crucial, industry-
changing transactions transpired when both 
Edyficar and Mibanco were acquired by BCP 
Figure 1
Return on Equity of Peruvian Banks and Microfinance Institutions
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in 2009 and 2014, respectively. In an industry 
with vigorous mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
activity, Peruvian MFIs are facing intensifying 
pressure to either adapt to the increasingly 
competitive environment and differentiate 
themselves or to sell themselves entirely 
(Taylor).
Consolidation in Peruvian 
Microfinance
Strategic Drivers of Mergers and 
Acquisitions
 M&A are common strategic growth 
alternatives. M&A activity usually occurs when 
there is too much competition in an industry 
and companies believe that the value resulting 
from synergies in combining firms is greater 
than the value of two separate companies, 
often because of economies of scale. In theory, 
a size advantage can serve as a foundation and 
catalyst for increased market share, product 
and service enhancement, and new market 
penetration opportunities (J.H. Chapman 
Group).
Emergence of Mergers and 
Acquisitions in Peruvian 
Microfinance
 As discussed previously, Peruvian MFIs 
have experienced incredible growth over the 
past 20 years. Additionally, the SBS has fostered 
an enabling environment for competition 
among various financial institutions. Heavy 
competition puts pressure on existing firms to 
improve efficiencies and reduce redundancies, 
which creates a strong incentive for M&A. In 
Planet Rating’s 2013 “Microfinance Index of 
Market Outreach and Saturation,” Peru was 
rated 4 on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 indicating 
that the market is underserved and 5 indicating 
that the market is potentially overheated. 
Experts surveyed by ResponsAbility indicate 
that mature microfinance markets, such as the 
one in Peru, focus on increasing efficiency and 
cutting costs (ResponsAbility, 2016).
 In a 2013 survey conducted in Peru by 
the Center for Financial Inclusion (Álvarez 
Cisneros), 199 participants—including senior 
professionals from the SBS, Central Reserve 
Bank of Peru, and Ministry of Development and 
Social Inclusion—described what they believed 
were obstacles to financial inclusion in Peru. 
The obstacles were unsustainable MFI growth, 
inefficient product cost structures, limited 
understanding of client needs, high costs 
of building/operating branches, and limited 
institutional capacity among MFIs. These 
concerns are good drivers for consolidation in 
the Peruvian microfinance industry. Naturally, 
intensifying competition—and, consequently, 
declining profitability—increases the need for 
both efficiency and innovation as institutions 
seek to capture market share and find their 
strategic niche. A list of previous M&A 
transactions in Peruvian microfinance is 
presented in Table 1, and a discussion about 
the deals that had a profound impact on the 
Peruvian microfinance environment follows.
 As previously mentioned, interest rates 
on microfinance loans dropped substantially 
from over 50 percent in 2000 to below 30 
percent in 2012. Consequently, the ROE of 
MFIs experienced a considerable decline. 
Rapidly declining profitability replaced the 
drive for organic growth (which is internal 
growth achieved by increasing a company’s own 
activities) with inorganic growth initiatives by 
means of M&A. The consolidation trend started 
in 2006 when Edyficar acquired Crear Cusco, 
a small MFI with a loan portfolio worth $2.3 
million, to further expand its client outreach 
(Dischner and Gabriel). Since then, Peru’s 
microfinance market has experienced mergers 
between various types of institutions as Peru’s 
flourishing microfinance industry soon started 
to attract attention from the large commercial 
banks BBVA, Scotiabank, and BCP.
 BBVA, the global Spanish bank operating 
through BBVA Continental in Peru, showed 
a strategic interest in the microfinance 
sector by setting up the BBVA Microfinance 
Foundation in 2007. At the end of 2007, the 
BBVA Microfinance Foundation purchased two 
CRACs, Caja Rural Nor Perú and Caja Rural 
del Sur. Next, in 2008 BBVA acquired Crear 
Tacna, an EDPYME, for $11.4 million. The 
bank ultimately combined the three entities to 
form Caja Nuestra Gente. Later, in 2010 BBVA 
acquired Financiera Confianza for $31.6 million 
and merged it with the recently formed Caja 
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Nuestra Gente to create Financiera Confianza 
S.A.A. (BBVA Microfinance Foundation). This 
series of acquisitions by the BBVA Microfinance 
Foundation allowed it to create the only 
Peruvian MFI with a presence in all 24 regions 
of Peru (Financiera Confianza).
 In addition, Scotiabank Peru, the Peruvian 
operating subsidiary of Scotiabank, a Canadian 
multinational bank, has demonstrated 
significant interest in the microfinance 
environment. In 2008 Scotiabank Peru 
acquired Banco del Trabajo, a commercial bank 
that specializes in providing financial services 
to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Scotiabank now operates a microfinance 
lending platform called CrediScotia, which 
formed as a result of the acquisition. After the 
deal, Scotiabank became Peru’s second-largest 
microfinance lender (Oxford Business Group, 
2014). With an expanded lending platform 
and extended consumer outreach capability, 
CrediScotia’s consumer and microfinance loan 
portfolio grew from approximately $0.3 billion 
in 2007 to $1.3 billion in 2012.
 Similarly, in 2009, BCP, the largest bank 
and supplier of integrated financial services in 
Peru, owned by the financial holding company 
Credicorp, demonstrated its interest in the 
thriving microfinance sector by acquiring 
Edyficar, the second-largest MFI in Peru, 
for $95 million. In 2014, BCP also acquired 
Mibanco, the largest MFI in Peru, for $179.5 
million through Edyficar. These two deals 
were by far the most significant in shaping the 
future of Peruvian microfinance.
 Prior to its acquisition in 2009, Edyficar 
was a huge commercial success, generating 
an average 29 percent ROE between 2006 and 
2009. Additionally, Edyficar experienced a 45 
percent compound annual growth rate in its 
total loan portfolio and grew its total client 
base from 45,000 to 194,000 clients from 2004 
to 2009 (Credicorp, 2009). However, one of the 
MFI’s main challenges was how to improve 
client services in an increasingly competitive 
environment (Dischner and Gabriel). 
Edyficar was ultimately acquired by BCP for 
$95 million, which was 2.5 times Edyficar’s 
book value. This high-acquisition premium 
demonstrated BCP’s urgency to break into 
the highly profitable microfinance sector 
in Peru and offer financial services to low-
income microentrepreneurs and underbanked 
communities. A few years earlier, BCP tried to 
break into the microfinance market in Peru 
and failed. By acquiring Edyficar, the bank 
Table 1
Mergers and Acquisitions in Peruvian Microfinance
Year Acquirer Target Deal Value 
($ millions)
2006 Edyficar Crear Cusco Undisclosed
2007 BBVA Caja Rural Nor Perú Undisclosed
2007 BBVA Caja Rural del Sur Undisclosed
2008 BBVA Crear Tacna 11.4
2008 Scotiabank Banco del Trabajo Undisclosed
2009 BCP Edyficar 96.0
2010 BBVA Financiera Confianza 31.6
2011 Compartamos Banco Financiera Creditos Arequipa 63.0
2012 Financiera Universal Caja Rural Profinanzas 18.5
2014 Credinka Financiera Nueva Visión 13.6
2014 Edyificar Mibanco 179.5
Sources: BBVA Microfinance Foundation; Chu; Credicorp, 2009; Credicorp, 2014; Dischner and Gabriel; Scotiabank.
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could augment its own core strengths (capital 
and financial services expertise) with those of 
Edyficar.
 Edyficar continued to thrive after it 
was acquired by BCP, generating an average 
31.7 percent ROE between 2010 and 2013. 
The MFI’s management was aggressive and 
wanted to continuously grow at an annual 
rate of 30 percent. Even with extraordinary 
financial results, the company faced several 
impediments to its goal of continuous growth. 
Peru’s microfinance market was becoming 
increasingly competitive; as stated previously, 
44 of the 55 entities regulated by the SBS were 
participating in microfinance activities. With 
intensifying competition putting downward 
pressure on pricing, there was an increasing 
desire to reduce transaction costs and increase 
productivity rather than to innovate. Soon, 
Edyficar looked to acquire Mibanco.
 The most significant M&A transaction 
in Peruvian microfinance so far was, 
unequivocally, the acquisition of Mibanco 
in 2014. In the early 2000s, Mibanco was the 
widely regarded industry leader in Peruvian 
microfinance. Mibanco experienced robust 
profitability from its inception as a bank in 
1998 to 2008: its ROE steadily grew from 0.8 
percent in 1998 to approximately 39 percent 
in 2008, with each successive year more 
profitable than the last. However, by 2009 it 
was facing its own significant challenges. The 
bank’s profitability from 2009 to 2012 suffered 
drastically due to its inability to respond to 
the increasingly competitive environment. In 
2012 Mibanco’s net income fell by 34 percent 
and its ROE dropped to 11 percent. To make 
matters worse, Mibanco’s loan portfolio 
deteriorated from 2012 to 2014 as delinquency 
rates increased, which some experts attributed 
to the fact that 61 percent of Mibanco’s clients 
had simultaneous loans with other MFIs 
(Chu). By 2014, Mibanco’s net income and 
ROE, in rapid decline since 2009, showed no 
signs of returning to their prior periods of 
profitability. Finally, in early 2014 Mibanco 
was acquired for $179.5 million, or 1.3 times 
its book value, by BCP through Edyficar. 
The 1.3 purchase multiple of the Mibanco 
transaction was significantly less than the 2.5 
purchase multiple of the Edyficar transaction. 
Ultimately, Mibanco’s declining profitability, 
rising loan loss provisions, and increasing 
inability to respond to the competitive 
landscape lowered its equity valuation and 
made it a prime acquisition target. BCP gladly 
took advantage of the opportunity to further 
expand its client base and solidify its foothold 
in Peruvian microfinance.
 The acquisition of Mibanco was intended 
to create value through economies of scale, 
savings through more appropriate funding 
structures, and reduced client acquisition 
costs (Credicorp, 2014). Although BCP decided 
not to merge these institutions into its own 
brand and instead chose to maintain them 
as separate companies dedicated to serving 
the microfinance sector, the newly formed 
entity would become the largest microfinance 
institution in Peru, with a 19.5 percent market 
share. As the major commercial banks joined 
in the wave of consolidation, microfinance 
was amalgamated with the commercial banks 
and solidified its place as an integral part of 
the Peruvian financial system. Even so, the 
landscape for Peruvian microfinance continues 
to evolve.
Recommendations for Peru’s 
Microfinance Industry and  
Strategic Outlook
 The massive wave of consolidation has 
effectively turned the Peruvian microfinance 
market into an oligopoly with BBVA, 
Scotiabank, and BCP at the forefront as the 
main competitors. These three banks owned 
approximately 42 percent of the industry 
gross loan portfolio in 2016 (MIX Market). 
The trend of commercial banks moving into 
the microfinance industry has integrated 
microfinance into a core component of 
Peruvian financial services.
 There are several main implications 
for MFIs and their clients from the ongoing 
consolidation in Peruvian microfinance. 
For microfinance borrowers, the intense 
competition and prevalent deal activity have 
resulted in lower interest rates, a more diverse 
product offering, and higher levels of client 
service. But the continuing competition and 
consolidation place increasing pressures on 
existing MFIs in Peru. To remain competitive 
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and avoid becoming acquired, existing 
MFIs must either innovate or differentiate 
themselves. Without a sound strategy in place 
to take advantage of opportunities that come 
with a free market, even market leaders such 
as Edyficar and Mibanco will become acquired.
 The Center for Financial Inclusion has 
argued that the most immediate way for Latin 
American MFIs to adapt to growing market 
competition is by committing to financial 
technology (fintech)—the use of software and 
digital platforms to deliver financial services 
(Taylor). A 2015 study by Accion showed that 
MFIs using technology saw increased revenue 
due to enhanced efficiencies, cost savings 
resulting from the elimination of paperwork, 
reduced fraud, and improved client service 
(Accion, “Digital Field Applications”). Thus, 
developing fintech products could mean 
increased sales, profitability, and market share.
 Fintech is quickly changing the landscape 
of the financial services industry. According 
to the Center for Financial Inclusion, fintech 
propels financial inclusion in three ways. First, 
fintech enables cheaper financial service access, 
delivery, and transaction processing, which 
could allow financial institutions to increase 
their consumer outreach. Second, fintech 
enhances credit analysis by integrating the due 
diligence process with data analytics, which 
could lead to higher-quality loan portfolios. 
And third, fintech allows microfinance clients 
to leave digital footprints. By analyzing digital 
footprints, financial institutions can get to 
know their customers and their specialized 
needs on a more profound level, confirm their 
identities and assets, and monitor debt levels 
with even greater transparency.
 Peruvian banks and MFIs are aware of 
the emergence of fintech and have taken the 
initiative to develop technology infrastructure 
and encourage customers to embrace the 
technology. Peruvian Digital Payments 
was established in July 2015 in a historic 
collaboration between Peru’s government, 
financial institutions, and telecommunications 
companies. Peruvian Digital Payments, co-
owned by the Association of Banks of Peru, 
created the Billetera Móvil (BiM) e-wallet. 
Publicly launched in February 2016, BiM is 
Peru’s first fully operable nationwide mobile 
money platform with the purpose of connecting 
all of Peru’s financial institutions’ customer 
bases through all three of Peru’s mobile carriers 
on one system. No other program in the world 
integrates all of a country’s banks and mobile 
carriers on a single platform (Bloomberg). This 
creation leads to a universal digital platform 
with greater transparency and tremendous 
opportunity for financial institutions to offer 
products and services.
 Fintech is the future of Peruvian 
microfinance and financial services. There 
are 32 million cell phones in Peru, which 
means there is a phone for every person. A 
quarter of those phones are smartphones. A 
2016 study discovered that most payments in 
emerging countries use cash, and Peru is no 
different: only 4 percent of transactions in Peru 
were completed digitally (McKinsey Global 
Institute). There is incredible growth potential 
here, and BCP recognizes this opportunity. 
In 2016, BCP was identified among 24 banks 
worldwide that were innovating financial 
services delivery channels and other uses 
of technology (Institute of International 
Finance). The bank is establishing a wide 
range of customer contact points that include 
ATMs, mobile banking, and e-money accounts. 
Furthermore, BCP is working to increase the 
acceptance of digital payments by merchants 
and to encourage digital, as opposed to cash, 
transactions by customers with the use of the 
BiM e-wallet. The bank has even put barriers to 
cashing out from BiM.
 These technology-enabled payments 
are the first step for future MFI innovation 
and differentiation. Subsequently, Peruvian 
MFIs could develop fintech infrastructure 
to utilize BiM as a platform to deliver other 
financial products, such as loans, savings, 
and insurance, creating opportunities for 
smaller MFIs and not just the big banks. For 
example, Tienda Pago is one of 45 microfinance 
fintech startups identified by Finnovista 
Fintech Radar Peru 2017 that are driving 
technological ventures to disrupt the big banks 
and the traditional financial services industry 
(Finnovista). Tienda Pago’s niche is providing 
short-term (1–2 weeks) working capital loans 
to the SME retail sector in Peru. These SME 
retailers use this credit to procure inventory 
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and to pay suppliers, whom Tienda Pago signs 
up to its digital platform. This technological 
development not only allows Tienda Pago’s 
borrowers to build a formal credit history but 
also enables business-to-business payments 
in a cashless ecosystem. Since its inception in 
2014, Tienda Pago has over 4,000 registered 
retailers and even large registered suppliers, 
such as the Coca-Cola Company and SABMiller 
(World Bank Group).
 Microfinance contributes to the development 
of a fully functioning financial sector. Access 
to financing enables microentrepreneurs to 
expand their businesses, which contributes to 
overall economic growth and development, 
a larger and more diversified product and 
services offering, and robust job creation 
(ResponsAbility, 2016). Peruvian microfinance 
has a long and rich history that has seen much 
success. After years of vigorous expansion, 
intense competition has led to widespread 
M&A. The entrance of large commercial 
banks has not only commercialized the 
microfinance industry and added it as a key 
component of Peru’s financial sector but also 
expanded financial services to much of Peru’s 
underbanked population. With much of Peru’s 
microfinance industry now consolidated, it 
is hoped that existing institutions and newly 
formed startups will positively embrace 
innovations, such as the emergence of fintech, 
and invest in fintech infrastructure to establish 
the foundation for the future of financial 
services in Peru and ultimately increase overall 
access to financial services.
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